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Abstract
Several alternatives vie today for recognition as the most plausible 
ontology, from physicalism to panpsychism. By and large, these on-
tologies entail that physical structures circumscribe consciousness by 
bearing phenomenal properties within their physical boundaries. The 
ontology of idealism, on the other hand, entails that all physical struc-
tures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phe-
nomenality in the first place. Unlike the other alternatives, however, 
idealism is often considered implausible today, particularly by analytic 
philosophers. A reason for this is the strong intuition that an objective 
world transcending phenomenality is a self-evident fact. Other argu-
ments—such as the dependency of phenomenal experience on brain 
function, the evidence for the existence of the universe before the 
origin of conscious life, etc.—are also often cited. In this essay, I will 
argue that these objections against the plausibility of idealism are false. 
As such, this essay seeks to show that idealism is an entirely plausible 
ontology.
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1 Introduction
The mainstream physicalist ontology posits that reality is constitut-
ed by irreducible physical entities—which Strawson (2006: 9) has 
called ‘ultimates’—outside and independent of phenomenality. Ac-
cording to physicalism, these ultimates, in and of themselves, do not 
instantiate phenomenal properties. In other words, there is nothing 
it is like to be an ultimate, phenomenality somehow emerging only 
at the level of complex arrangements of ultimates. As such, under 
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physicalism phenomenality is not fundamental, but instead reducible 
to physical parameters of arrangements of ultimates.
What I will call ‘microexperientialism’, in turn, posits that there 
is already something it is like to be at least some ultimates (Strawson 
et al. 2006: 24–29), combinations of these experiencing ultimates 
somehow leading to more complex experience. As such, under micro-
experientialism phenomenality is seen as an irreducible aspect of at 
least some ultimates. The ontology of panexperientialism (Griffin 
1998: 77–116, Rosenberg 2004: 91–103, Skrbina 2007: 21–22) is 
analogous to microexperientialism, except in that the former en-
tails the stronger claim that all ultimates instantiate phenomenal 
properties.
Micropsychism (Strawson et al. 2006: 24–29) and panpsychism 
(Skrbina 2007: 15–22) are analogous—maybe even identical—to 
microexperientialism and panexperientialism, respectively, except 
perhaps in that some formulations of the former admit cognition—a 
more complex form of phenomenality—already at the level of ulti-
mates, as an irreducible aspect of these ultimates.
While microexperientialism, panexperientialism, micropsy-
chism and panpsychism entail that bottom-up combinations of 
simple subjects give rise to more complex ones, such as human be-
ings, cosmopsychism (Nagasawa and Wager 2016) takes the opposite 
route. Indeed, “the first postulate of cosmopsychism is that the cosmos 
as a whole is the only ontological ultimate there is, and that it is conscious” 
(Shani 2015: 408, the emphasis is Shani’s).
Finally, the ontology of idealism is characterized by a combina-
tion of two propositions: (a) phenomenal consciousness is irreduc-
ible; and (b) everything else—the whole of nature—is reducible to a 
unitary and universal phenomenal consciousness (henceforth, I shall 
refer to phenomenal consciousness simply as ‘consciousness’).
Idealism may be consistent with—even identical to—certain in-
terpretations of cosmopsychism. According to Shani, for instance, 
cosmopsychism entails that “an omnipresent cosmic consciousness 
is the single ontological ultimate there is” (2015: 390). This perfect-
ly embodies the defining tenet of idealism insofar as it implies that 
everything—including the physical—can be reduced to the phenom-
enal. Shani also writes that matter is the cosmos “in its appearance 
as exterior complement to the subjective realities of created selves” 
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(2015: 412, emphasis added). The notion that matter is the phenom-
enal appearance of equally phenomenal dynamics is also eminently 
idealist. Therefore, these interpretations of cosmopsychism are es-
sentially indistinguishable from idealism and I shall, henceforth, re-
fer to them simply as idealism.
Other possible interpretations of cosmopsychism entail that the 
cosmos as a whole bears phenomenal properties—i.e. has inner life 
—but also has an aspect—the physical universe we can measure—
that is irreducible to these phenomenal properties. Naturally, this 
implies a form of dual-aspect monism, a la Spinoza (Skrbina 2007: 
88). Indeed, under these views the cosmos can still be said to be 
conscious, but not in consciousness. In the former case, the cosmos bears 
phenomenality; in the latter—which is the idealist view—the cos-
mos is constituted by phenomenality. Interpretations of cosmopsy-
chism that are not consistent with idealism shall not be further ad-
dressed in this paper.
In what follows, I will attempt to rebut the most common objec-
tions to the plausibility of idealism. I will seek to show that these 
objections are based on circular reasoning, conflation, unexamined 
assumptions, and several other misconceptions.
2 The felt concreteness objection
English poet Samuel Johnson is said to have argued against Bishop 
Berkeley’s idealism by kicking a large stone while exclaiming: ‘I re-
fute it thus!’ (Boswell 1820: 218) Johnson was clearly appealing to 
the felt concreteness of the stone to suggest that it could not be just 
a figment of imagination. Indeed, the felt concreteness of the world 
is probably the main reason why people intuitively reject the notion 
that reality unfolds in consciousness. If a truck hits you, you will 
hurt, even if you are an idealist.
However, notice that appeals to concreteness, solidity, palpabil-
ity and any other quality that we have come to associate with things 
outside consciousness are still appeals to phenomenality. After all, 
concreteness, solidity and palpability are qualities of experience. What 
else? A stone allegedly outside consciousness, in and by itself, is en-
tirely abstract and has no qualities. If anything, by pointing to the 
felt concreteness of the stone Johnson was implicitly suggesting the 
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primacy of experience over abstraction, which is eminently idealist.
We have come to automatically interpret the felt concreteness of 
the world as evidence that the world is outside consciousness. But 
this is an unexamined artifact of subliminal thought-models. Our 
only access to the world is through sense perception, which is it-
self phenomenal. The notion that there is a world outside and inde-
pendent of the phenomenal is an explanatory model, not an empirical 
fact. No phenomenal quality can be construed as direct evidence for 
something outside phenomenality.
3 The private minds objection
As discussed in the Introduction, under idealism there is only one 
universal consciousness. Yet, at a personal level, our mental lives 
are clearly separate from one another. I do not have direct access to 
your thoughts and feelings and, presumably, neither do you to mine. 
Moreover, I do not seem to be aware of what is happening across the 
galaxy and, presumably, neither are you. So, if all reality is reducible 
to one universal consciousness, how can there be separate private 
minds such as yours and mine?
To make sense of this under idealism, we need to review a mental 
condition called dissociation (Braude 1995, Kelly et al. 2009: 167–
174 and 348–352, Schlumpf et al. 2014, Strasburger and Waldvogel 
2015). Indeed, it is now well established in psychiatry that mental 
contents can undergo “a disruption of and/or discontinuity in [their] 
normal integration” (Black and Grant 2014: 191). This normal inte-
gration of mental contents takes place through chains of cognitive as-
sociations: a perception may evoke an abstract idea, which may trig-
ger a memory, which may inspire a thought, etc. These associations 
are logical, in the sense that e.g. the memory inspires the thought be-
cause of a certain implicit logic linking the two. Integrated mentation 
can thus be modeled, for ease of visualization, as a connected direct-
ed graph. See Figure 1a. Each vertex in the graph represents a par-
ticular mental content and each edge a cognitive association logically 
linking mental contents together. Every mental content in the graph 
of Figure 1a can be reached from any other mental content through a 
chain of cognitive associations. Dissociation, in turn, can be visual-
ized as what happens when the graph becomes disconnected, such 
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as shown in Figure 1b. Some mental contents can then no longer be 
reached from others. Following the psychiatric convention, I shall 
refer to the subgraph with grey vertices as a (dissociated) alter.
Figure 1. A connected graph (a) illustrating normal integration of 
mental contents, and a disconnected graph (b) illustrating dissociation 
and the corresponding formation of an alter (subgraph in grey).
Because cognitive associations are essentially logical, as opposed to 
spatio-temporal, the scheme of representation in Figure 1 allows 
for the simultaneous experience of multiple mental contents linked 
together in a connected subgraph. This is empirically justifiable: a 
perception, for instance, can be experienced at the same time as the 
thoughts it evokes and the emotions evoked by these thoughts. More-
over—and by the same token—the two disconnected subgraphs in 
Figure 1b can also represent two concurrently conscious subjects of 
experience. The substantiation for this is again empirical: there is 
compelling evidence that different alters of the same psyche can be 
co-conscious (Kelly et al. 2009: 317–322, Braude 1995: 67–68).
An alter loses direct access to mental contents surrounding it, 
but remains integral to the underlying consciousness that constitutes it. The 
disconnection between an alter and surrounding mental contents is 
logical, not ontic. As an analogy, a database may contain entries that 
are not indexed and, therefore, cannot be reached, but this does not 
physically separate those entries from the rest of the database.
Dissociation can coherently explain how seemingly separate but 
concurrently conscious subjects of experience—such as you and me 
—can form under idealism: each is an alter of universal conscious-
ness. And because each alter becomes unable to evoke the mental 
contents of another, their respective inner lives acquire a seemingly 
private character, even though they remain integral to the underlying 
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consciousness that constitutes them.
4 The stand-alone world objection
If all there is is consciousness, does the world continue to exist when 
not consciously observed by a living being? A negative answer to this 
question seems extremely implausible yet difficult to avoid under 
idealism. Bishop Berkeley has famously attempted to circumvent it 
by appealing to a divinity, as captured in Ronald Knox’s limerick, 
God in the Quad:
There was a young man who said ‘God
Must find it exceedingly odd
To think that the tree
Should continue to be
When there’s no one about in the quad.’
Reply:
‘Dear Sir: Your astonishment’s odd;
I am always about in the quad.
And that’s why the tree
Will continue to be
Since observed by, Yours faithfully, God.’
Legitimate as an appeal to a divinity might have been in Berke-
ley’s time, today more rigor is expected from a viable ontology. So 
how do we solve the problem of a stand-alone world under idealism?
With reference to the discussion in the preceding section, notice 
that, by definition, mental contents inside an alter of universal con-
sciousness cannot directly evoke mental contents outside the alter, 
or vice-versa. But they can still influence or impinge on each other. In-
deed, mental impingement across a dissociative boundary is empiri-
cally known. Lynch and Kilmartin (2013: 100), for instance, report 
that dissociated feelings can dramatically affect our thoughts, while 
Eagleman (2011: 20–54) shows that dissociated expectations rou-
tinely mold our perceptions. We can visualize this as in Figure 2a, 
wherein the partial overlap of adjacent vertices internal and external 
to the alter (cf. Figure 1b) represents mental impingement across its 
dissociative boundary.
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Figure 2. Mental contents impinging on the dissociative boundary of 
an alter, illustrated in two different ways (a) and (b).
Figure 2b illustrates the exact same thing according to a simplified 
representation: the broader consciousness is represented as a white 
circle with an alter represented as a grey circle within it. The dashed 
arrows represent the impingement of external and internal mental 
contents on each other, across the alter’s boundary. I will henceforth 
use this simplified representation.
Now notice that mental contents of universal consciousness that 
surround—but remain external to—an alter can impinge on the alter’s 
boundary from the outside. Under idealism, it can be coherently ar-
gued that this is what gives rise to sense perceptions: the physical 
world around us is the extrinsic appearance on the screen of percep-
tion of phenomenality surrounding our respective alter. See Figure 
3.
Figure 3. Mental contents of universal consciousness surrounding an 
alter can cause the alter’s sense perceptions by impinging on its dis-
sociative boundary.
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The stand-alone character of the world can thus be coherently ex-
plained: the physical world is a perceptual representation of phenom-
enality dissociated from our personal psyche and, as such, indepen-
dent of our personal inner life. The physical world continues to exist 
—in the form of phenomenality outside our respective alter—even 
as we sleep.
5 The autonomy of nature objection
A closely related objection is this: nature unfolds according to pat-
terns and regularities—the “laws of nature”—independent of our 
volition. Human beings cannot change these laws. But if nature is in 
consciousness, should that not be possible by a mere act of imagina-
tion?
This objection can be rebutted along the same lines as the previ-
ous one. However, there is a more direct and intuitive refutation. 
Notice that the implicit assumption here is that all mental activity is 
acquiescent to volition, which is patently false even in our own per-
sonal psyche. After all, by and large we cannot control our dreams, 
nightmares, emotions, and even many of our thoughts. They come, 
develop and go on their own terms. At a pathological level, schizo-
phrenics cannot control their visions and people suffering from ob-
sessive-compulsive disorder are constantly at the mercy of oppres-
sive thoughts. There are numerous examples of conscious activity 
that escapes the control of volition. Often, we do not even recognize 
this activity as our own; i.e. we do not identify with it. It unfolds 
as autonomous, seemingly external phenomena, such as dreams and 
schizophrenic hallucinations. Yet, all this activity is unquestionably 
within consciousness. We perceive it as separate from ourselves be-
cause the part of our psyche that gives rise to this activity is dissoci-
ated from the ego, the part with which we do identify.
So that there is activity in universal consciousness that we do not 
identify with and cannot control is entirely consistent with ideal-
ism. This activity is simply dissociated from our ego and its sense of 
volition.
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6 The shared world objection
If all reality is in consciousness, then the world is akin to a dream. As 
such, idealism implies that we are all partaking in roughly the same 
dream. Yet, since our bodies are separate, we cannot be sharing a 
dream; or so the objection goes.
The objection begs the question by implicitly assuming that the 
body circumscribes dreaming consciousness, as opposed to the other 
way around. Only under this assumption does the impossibility of 
sharing a dream follow from the fact that bodies are separate. But 
under idealism, it is the body that is in universal consciousness, not 
consciousness in the body. Once this is properly understood accord-
ing to the framework developed in the preceding sections, the rebut-
tal of this objection becomes rather straightforward: we all seem to 
inhabit the same world because our respective alters are surrounded 
by the same universal field of phenomenality, like whirlpools in a 
single stream. See Figure 4, which simply extends Figure 3 to mul-
tiple alters.
Figure 4. Alters of universal consciousness and their shared world.
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7 The natural order objection
The world we perceive around ourselves is governed by stable and 
orderly natural laws. Therefore, if the contents of perception are a 
representation of phenomenality in universal consciousness, then 
this phenomenality must be stable and orderly at root. But our own 
personal thoughts and emotions are notoriously unstable and disor-
derly. So how plausible is it that the order and stability we discern 
in the laws of nature represent thoughts or emotions in universal 
consciousness?
The misconception here, of course, is that of anthropomorphiza-
tion: to attribute to universal consciousness as a whole cognitive 
characteristics known only in small dissociated aspects of it, such 
as human beings. Nothing in idealism precludes the possibility that 
phenomenality in universal consciousness unfolds according to very 
stable and orderly patterns and regularities, whose extrinsic appear-
ance corresponds to the laws of nature. That our human thoughts 
and emotions seem rather reactive and unstable is a product of evo-
lution under the pressures of natural selection within a particular 
planetary ecosystem. At a universal level, consciousness has not un-
dergone such evolutionary pressures.
Under physicalism, the laws of nature are seen as irreducible 
causal patterns somehow built into the fabric of the cosmos. It is the 
dynamic unfolding of these patterns that leads to the order and com-
plexity we see around ourselves. Under idealism, such irreducible 
causal patterns are posited to be somehow built into universal con-
sciousness itself, instead of an objective fabric of space-time. Yet, 
beyond this distinction, they are the same patterns that physicalism en-
tails, as inherent to consciousness as physical laws are allegedly in-
herent to the fabric of space-time. Idealism poses no extra difficulty 
than physicalism in this regard.
This can be better understood with a simple terminology move. 
Certain schools of psychology speak of ‘psychological archetypes’: 
innate, built-in templates according to which mental dynamics 
unfold (Jung 1991). As such, we can say that, under idealism, the 
laws of nature are the archetypes of universal consciousness. They are 
built-in templates according to which the “vibrations” of universal 
consciousness—i.e. phenomenality—develop, analogously to how 
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the physical constraints of a vibrating surface determine its natural 
modes of vibration.
8 The equivalence objection
As we have seen in Sections 4 to 6, idealism acknowledges that there 
is a world outside personal psyches, since personal psyches are but dis-
sociated aspects of a broader universal consciousness. The objection, 
then, is that the notion of a broad stream of phenomenality outside 
personal psyches is equivalent to the physicalist postulate of a world 
outside consciousness.
Except for solipsism, any viable ontology must entail at least one 
inference beyond direct experience. This is necessary to make sense 
of the fact that we all inhabit the same world beyond ourselves and 
are unable to change its governing laws. For this reason, physicalism 
infers the existence of a universe outside consciousness, which we all 
inhabit. Idealism, on the other hand, infers simply that conscious-
ness itself extends beyond its face-value personal boundaries. This 
way, while physicalism postulates a fundamentally new ontological 
class next to experience, idealism simply extrapolates the boundaries 
of consciousness—the sole undeniable ontological class and primary 
datum of existence—beyond those we can probe directly. To put it 
metaphorically, while idealism makes sense of reality by inferring 
that the Earth extends beyond the visible horizon, physicalism does 
so by inferring the existence of an isomorphic but ontologically dis-
tinct “shadow” Earth. Clearly, the former is a more parsimonious 
inference and, as such, not equivalent to the latter.
More importantly, the implications of idealism are radically dif-
ferent from those of physicalism. For instance, while physicalism 
implies that consciousness ends upon the death of the body, idealism 
implies merely the end of the corresponding dissociation, not of con-
sciousness proper. I have elaborated on further differences in impli-
cations elsewhere (Kastrup 2015: 185–198).
9 The primacy of brain function objection
Not only are there (a) clear correlations between specific patterns of 
brain activity and reported inner experience (Koch 2004), we know 
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that (b) physical interference with the brain—such as head trauma 
and the use of psychoactive drugs—can influence one’s inner life 
rather dramatically. This may seem to suggest an arrow of causation 
pointing from a physical body outside consciousness to phenomenal-
ity, which would contradict idealism.
To make sense of observation (a), we need to briefly recapitulate 
earlier discussions. As we have seen in Section 3, under idealism 
private minds—such as our own human psyche—can be explained 
as dissociated alters of universal consciousness. We have also seen in 
Section 4 that the stand-alone world around us can be explained as 
the extrinsic appearance of phenomenality surrounding—but out-
side—our respective alter. Now, from the point of view of a given 
alter A, nothing prevents the dissociated mental activity of an alter B 
from being part of the phenomenality surrounding A. B is then part 
of A’s world and, as such, must also have an extrinsic appearance on 
A’s screen of perception. In other words, there must be something al-
ters look like from a second-person point of view. And since we know 
from direct experience that our private inner life extends only to 
the boundaries of our metabolizing body—after all, we cannot per-
ceive things that do not impinge on our skin or other sense organs, 
or move anything beyond our own body through direct intention— 
metabolizing bodies seem prima facie to be the extrinsic appearance 
of dissociated alters of universal consciousness. If so, this means that 
all living beings have private inner lives in some way analogous to our 
own, but tables and chairs do not. The latter are simply part of the 
inanimate universe, which, as a whole, is the extrinsic appearance of 
phenomenality outside all alters.
Brain activity, of course, is integral to a metabolizing human 
body. Therefore, under idealism, brain activity is simply part of what 
one’s private inner experiences—self-reflective and otherwise, as I 
will elaborate upon in the next section—look like from across a dis-
sociative boundary. To put it another way, one’s brain activity is part 
of a phenomenal representation of one’s inner life. And of course, 
a representation must correlate with the phenomenal process it is 
the appearance of, without requiring anything ontologically distinct 
from consciousness. That this correlation is empirically observed is 
thus entirely consistent with idealism.
A possible counterargument here is this: the patterns of neural 
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activity one can measure with functional brain scanners can be enor-
mously complex in terms of information content; perhaps more 
complex than the contents of consciousness we have introspective 
access to. What does the extra complexity then correspond to? The 
key to answering this question is in the next section, wherein a dis-
tinction will be made between contents of consciousness we have 
introspective access to—i.e. can self-reflect upon—and contents of 
consciousness that, despite still being experienced, fall outside the 
reach of introspection. The extra complexity, insofar as it indeed is 
the case, corresponds to the latter.
Regarding observation (b) of the objection, the suggested arrow 
of causation is based on an unexamined but pervasive assumption: 
that the physical is in some sense distinct from, yet causally effective 
upon, the phenomenal. This is precisely what idealism denies. Under 
idealism, the physical is simply the contents of perception, a particu-
lar type of phenomenality. As such, what we call ‘physical interfer-
ence with the brain’ is the extrinsic appearance of phenomenality ex-
ternal to an alter that disrupts the inner experiences of the alter from 
across its dissociative boundary. The disruption “pierces through” 
the boundary, so to speak. And that certain types of phenomenality 
disrupt other types of phenomenality is not only entailed by ideal-
ism, but also empirically trivial. After all, our thoughts disrupt our 
emotions—and vice-versa—every day. For the same reason that 
thoughts disrupt emotions, “physical interference with the brain” 
disrupts an organism’s inner life. None of this contradicts idealism.
10 The unconscious mentation objection
In Libet’s now famous experiments (1985), neuroscientists were able 
to record, a fraction of a second before subjects reported making a 
decision to act, mounting brain activity associated with the initiation 
of a simple voluntary action. At first sight, this would seem to indi-
cate that decisions are made in a neural substrate outside conscious-
ness, thereby contradicting idealism. I use Libet’s experiments here 
merely as an example, for today we know of many other instances of 
seemingly unconscious mentation, such as moving one’s foot halfway 
to the brake pedal before one becomes aware of danger ahead (Eagle-
man 2011: 5). Under idealism, since everything is in consciousness, 
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there cannot be such a thing as unconscious mentation. So what is 
going on?
The misconception here is a conflation of consciousness proper 
with a particular configuration of consciousness. Indeed, to report an 
experience—such as making a decision to act or seeing danger ahead 
—to another or to oneself, one has to both (a) have the experience 
and (b) know that one has the experience, which Schooler (2002) 
called a ‘re-representation’. In other words, one can only report 
phenomenality that one is self-reflectively aware of at a metacog-
nitive level. But self-reflection is just a particular configuration of 
consciousness, whereby consciousness turns in upon itself to experi-
ence knowledge of its own phenomenality (Kastrup 2014: 104–110). 
Nothing precludes the possibility that phenomenality takes place 
outside the field of self-reflection. In this case, we cannot report the 
phenomenality—not even to ourselves—because we do not know 
that we experience it.
The argument above is not idiosyncratic, for the existence of 
unreportable phenomenality is well established in neuroscience to-
day (Tsuchiya et al. 2015, Vandenbroucke et al. 2014). Indeed, as 
elaborated upon by Schooler (2002), reportability is an extra func-
tion at a metacognitive level, on top of phenomenality proper. So the 
possibility that presents itself to us is that all mentation is actually 
conscious, even though we cannot report much of it. As such, the 
decisions made by Libet’s subjects could well have been made in con-
sciousness, but outside the field of self-reflection. The correspond-
ing phenomenality then entered this field a fraction of a second later, 
thereby becoming reportable. Analogously, drivers may consciously 
see danger ahead before they can tell themselves that they see danger 
ahead. The appearance of unconscious mentation due to unreportabil-
ity does not contradict idealism.
11 The unconsciousness objection
Along similar lines, the idea here is that, when we e.g. faint or un-
dergo general anesthesia, we become seemingly unconscious. Yet, 
we do not cease to exist because of it, which may seem to contradict 
the idealist tenet that our body is the extrinsic appearance of con-
scious inner life.
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Let us consider this more carefully. Imagine that you wake up 
in the morning after hours of deep sleep. You may remember noth-
ing of what happened during those preceding hours, concluding 
that you were unconscious all night. Then, later in the day, you sud-
denly remember that you actually had a very intense dream. So you 
were not unconscious all night, you simply could not remember your 
experiences.
Indeed, all we can assert with confidence upon coming round 
from episodes of seeming unconsciousness is that we cannot remem-
ber phenomenality occurring during those episodes. The actual ab-
sence of phenomenality is impossible to assert with confidence. As 
a matter of fact, many things we have traditionally associated with 
unconsciousness are now known to entail intense experiences. For 
instance, fainting caused by e.g. asphyxiation, strangulation or hy-
perventilation is known to correlate with euphoria, insights and vi-
sions (Neal 2008: 310–315, Rhinewine and Williams 2007, Retz 
2007). G-force-induced loss of consciousness (G-LOC) is also known 
to correlate with “memorable dreams” (Whinnery and Whinnery 
1990). There is even evidence for “implicit perception” during gen-
eral anesthesia (Kihlstrom and Cork 2007).
Sleep, of course, is known to correlate with dreams. But even 
during phases of sleep wherein electroencephalogram readings show 
no dream-related neural activity, there are other types of activ-
ity that may correlate with non-recallable phenomenality distinct 
from dreams. Indeed, this is precisely what a recent study points 
out: “there are good empirical and theoretical reasons for saying 
that a range of different types of sleep experience, some of which 
are distinct from dreaming, can occur in all stages of sleep” (Windt, 
Nielsen, and Thompson 2016: 871, emphasis added). The authors 
identify three different categories of sleep experiences distinct from 
dreams: (a) non-immersive imagery and sleep thinking, (b) percep-
tions and bodily sensations, and (c) “selfless” states and contentless 
sleep experiences that may be similar to those reported by experi-
enced meditators.
As such, what the empirical data shows is that episodes of seem-
ing unconsciousness are associated with an impairment of memory 
formation or access, but not necessarily with absence of phenome-
nality. As a matter of fact, there are strong indications, as mentioned 
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above, that the opposite is true.
12 The solipsism objection
Some conflate idealism with solipsism, the notion that the world is 
one’s personal dream, all other living creatures being just figments of 
one’s personal imagination. Under solipsism, there is nothing it is 
like to be other people; they have no inner life; they exist only as ap-
pearances in the personal psyche of the dreamer. As such, whatever 
empirical evidence one brings to bear and whatever one says to a so-
lipsist must be regarded by the solipsist as figments of his or her own 
imagination, which renders solipsism unfalsifiable. So the objection 
here is that, by being unfalsifiable, solipsism—and therefore ideal-
ism—is beneath philosophical debate.
Naturally, idealism is not solipsism. Under idealism, there is 
something it is like to be other living creatures; they also have pri-
vate inner lives. So idealists take other people seriously as legitimate 
sources of reported experiences and views, not just as figments of 
one’s own imagination. Moreover, idealists acknowledge that there is 
a world outside and independent of their personal (dissociated) psyche, as dis-
cussed in Sections 4 to 6. They simply do not acknowledge that this 
world is ontologically distinct from consciousness itself. Indeed, by 
acknowledging that dissociation in universal consciousness implies a 
world outside their own personal mentation, idealists look upon this 
world in a way entirely compatible with naturalism and scientific 
inquiry.
Unlike solipsism, idealism has the burden to explain observations 
non-trivially. Consider three basic facts that are often used to justify 
physicalism: (a) the laws of nature are independent of our personal 
volition; (b) we all seem to inhabit the same world; and (c) there 
are tight correlations between observable brain activity and reported 
inner life. Solipsism trivializes all three facts in lieu of actually mak-
ing sense of them: the solipsist allegedly dreams them all up, rather 
arbitrarily. The idealist, on the other hand, by acknowledging the 
inner lives of other people and the autonomous nature of the world, 
has the burden to reconcile these three facts with the notion that 
reality unfolds in consciousness. If idealism is correct, (a) how come 
we cannot simply imagine a different and better world? If the world 
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is akin to a dream in consciousness, (b) how come we are all having 
the same dream? If consciousness is not generated by the brain, (c) 
how come are there such tight correlations between brain activity 
and inner experience? These questions have already been answered 
in Sections 5, 6 and 9, respectively. The important point here is this: 
idealism is falsifiable in that, if it cannot answer these and other ques-
tions in terms of universal consciousness alone, it must be discarded.
13 The cosmological history objection
There is overwhelming evidence for the existence of the universe 
before conscious life arose. Therefore—or so the objection goes— 
it is untenable to say that the universe exists in consciousness. This 
may strike some readers as obviously question-begging—which, of 
course, it is—but please bear with me for the sake of completeness.
The implicit assumption here is that consciousness arises only 
with biology, as a product of biology. Naturally, this is precisely what 
idealism denies. Under idealism, biology is merely the extrinsic ap-
pearance of dissociated, local differentiations of consciousness (i.e. alters), 
not the constituent or generator of consciousness. There was uni-
versal consciousness before such dissociated, local differentiations 
arose. And there was phenomenality in this universal consciousness 
corresponding to the inanimate universe prior to the origin of life.
14 The implausibility of cosmic inner life objection
The last objection I will address in this essay is, like the first, purely 
intuitive. It asks rhetorically: How plausible is it that the inanimate 
universe as a whole is the extrinsic appearance of some kind of uni-
versal inner life? The intuitive appeal of the question is understand-
able. After all, we only have introspective access to our own (dis-
sociated) personal inner life, so to gauge the presence of other or 
broader inner life we depend on perceivable external indicators. In 
other people and animals, these indicators are their behavior. But 
within the extremely small range of space and time in which we live 
our lives—and even in which human history as a whole has unfolded 
—we simply cannot perceive any intuitively-appealing indicator of 
universal inner life.
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Yet, we can approach the question from a different angle. Con-
sider a living brain exposed by surgeons during an operation. It is a 
very concrete object that can be seen, touched, cut, cauterized, etc. 
It is composed of the same types of atoms and force fields that make 
up the universe as a whole. There is nothing magical about a brain 
insofar as we can gauge in the screen of perception. And neither can 
we discern any intuitively-appealing indicator of inner life by simply 
looking at an exposed brain.
Nonetheless, we all know that “behind” the living brain lies the 
entire inner life of a person, with love affairs and heartbreaks, suc-
cesses and disappointments, great adventures and quiet introspective 
insights, great joy and indescribable suffering. “Behind” that very 
concrete object under the surgeon’s scalpel there lies a world of phe-
nomenality. Counterintuitive or not, this is the way nature is: what 
we call physical structures—such as living brains—can correspond 
in some way to rich phenomenality. We may not know how this is so, 
but we do know that it is so.
Therefore, unless we solve the “hard problem of consciousness” 
(Chalmers 2003) and explain what makes brains different from the 
inanimate universe as a whole in this regard, if brains correspond to 
inner life it is not at all implausible that the inanimate universe as a 
whole could as well. After all, brains are made of the same “stuff ” 
that the rest of the universe is also made of.
One could argue at this point that only particular structural and 
functional organizations of this “stuff,” as found in brains, are con-
ducive to the kind of information processing associated with human 
inner life. For instance, Tononi (2004) has shown that reportable ex-
periences correlate only with complex networks of information inte-
gration in the brain. Although it has recently been shown that there 
are structural similarities between brains and the universe at its larg-
est scales (Krioukov et al. 2012), it is implausible that analogous in-
formation integration takes place at a universal level. The distances 
and signal propagation times involved do not permit it (Siegel 2016).
However, the hypothesis offered here is not that the universe has 
human-like cognition and associated information integration. As a 
matter of fact, the hypothesis is not even that the universe has cogni-
tion, defined as the capacity to acquire knowledge or understanding. 
Instead, the claim is simply that there is raw experience—qualia, pure 
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and simple—associated with the universe as a whole, which does not 
require anything like the kind of information integration underlying 
human self-reflection.
15 Conclusions
Idealism is a unique ontology in that, unlike physicalism and panpsy-
chism, it asserts that physical structures are circumscribed by con-
sciousness, as opposed to the other way around. Yet, analytic philos-
ophy has traditionally considered idealism implausible. In this essay, 
I have argued that the alleged implausibility of idealism is based on 
misconceptions, such as:
•	 Unfounded intuition—e.g. taking the concreteness of the 
world to indicate its independence from consciousness, or as-
serting the implausibility of universal inner life;
•	 Lack of philosophical imagination—e.g. assuming that mul-
tiple private minds and a stand-alone world cannot be coher-
ently reduced to a single universal consciousness;
•	 Demonstrably wrong assumptions—e.g. that all mental ac-
tivity is acquiescent to volition;
•	 Question-begging—e.g. arguing that different people cannot 
share a dream because their bodies are separate, and arguing 
that the universe cannot be in consciousness because it ex-
isted before conscious life first arose;
•	 Anthropomorphization—e.g. taking all conceivable process-
es in consciousness to necessarily be unstable and disorderly;
•	 Failure to understand the implications of idealism—e.g. as-
serting that a field of phenomenality outside personal psyches 
is equivalent to a physical world outside phenomenality;
•	 Unexamined assumptions—e.g. that the physical is in some 
sense distinct from, yet causally effective upon, the phenomenal;
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•	 Conflation—e.g. conflating consciousness proper with self-
reflection, conflating unconsciousness with failure to recall 
phenomenality, and conflating idealism with solipsism.
As such, idealism is an entirely plausible ontology that may of-
fer the most parsimonious and explanatorily powerful option yet to 
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